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There is a close correlation between wal' and change oj the world configuration. Certain
characteristics oj war thus correspond to particular properties oj the world configuration
which is, in turn, seen as a political system determined by its economic bases. Many post-cold
war conflicts concentrated around the Jormer Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Central
Asia-and all these wars could be attributed to the Adjustment oj the European Political
Structure. Following the changes in the world configuration, the US emerged as the only
power with the global capacity, thus the US strategy appeared as the major weight in the
adjustment oj the world configuration. For the US strategists the Jour principal strategic
areas are America, Europe, East Asia, and the Indian Ocean, but only the Western Europe has
a potential to challenge the US global status. So JaI~ the main US global strategy lVas to
maintain the one-superpower plus major-powers configuration and a merge oj any two major
powers would outstrip the US super-power global status.
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1. Introduction
The breakup of the USSR put an end to the
bipolar world configuration. The new configuration
is yet to take form. International actors, especially
those of great powers, are endeavouring to secure a
better position in the coming new configuration. As
history teaches repeatedly us, war, the special kind
of politics, has played an indispensable role in the
formation of the new configuration. The Kosovo cri-
sis proved to be the illustrative case. It proves that
the US-West European competition is the major
cause of the Kosovo crisis.
2. War and the Change
of World Configuration
War and the change of the world configura-
tion correlate closely. Thus the scale and style of war
. Lecturer at the Shangahi Institute for International Studies.
correspond to the scale and needs of the change of
the world configuration. The world configuration is
in essence a political system, which in Marxist theory
belongs to the realm of superstructure and is thus
determined by the economic basis. War in
Clausewitz ' words is politics by other means. As the
production relations change, so changes the politi-
cal superstructure, and war is their midwife, which
can be proved invariably by human history includ-
ing the Kosovo crisis. For instance, prior to the two
world wars, especially to the Second World War, the
strength of the United States and USSR respectively
had grown and outstripped, one by one, the old Eu-
ropean powers while the latter still dominated the
world order of the day. That is to say, international
relations of production had changed without corrc-
sponding changes in their political relations. In other
words, the main cause of both world wars was the
stagnation of political changes in response to eco-
nomic changes.World War I failed to solve the issue
of US exceeding over the UK and France in power
but lagging behind them in international status, a situ-
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ation that would not last long. "The world market
under the hegemony of Britain went into crisis at the
end of the period (1815-1914), owing to the accen-
tuation of rivalry from Germany and the United
States. The system was gradually restructured by
retreats of the older imperial powers and their re-
placement by newer rivals in the crusade to carve up
the world. But this process led to war.""
It was not until World War II that the US be-
came the leader of the capitalist world. No one is
able to challenge it without war and, more impor-
tantly, without economic strength. The USSR had
won the war due, not to its political appeal and nor
to its military art, but due to its industrial capacity to
produce iron and steel and other raw materials. Who
ever wins the war wins the status. There is no alter-
native.
In the post-Cold War era, many wars and mili-
tary conflicts occurred in Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia or around the former Soviet "Empire". All
those wars were unexceptionally attributed to the
Adjustment of the European Political Structure. The
declining of the Soviet economic strength started at
least a decade earlier than, and actually brought about
to its final collapse. The USSR was so weak eco-
nomically that it could not even keep up its empire,
the Eastern bloc as well as the Soviet Union itself. It
is the Soviet Union rather than the Eastern bloc that
initiated, and had the power to initiate, what later
proved to be the "liberation" of the Eastern Europe.
And it is Russia rather than other former Soviet re-
publics that first seceded from the Soviet Union.
Those two events led to the end of Cold War and the
bipolar world configuration. But the new configura-
tion of Europe is yet to be established. Wars are in-
evitable in the process of the configuration change
of Europe. Of course, wars are confined to the areas
that associate with the contraction of the core nation
of the USSR, i.e. Russia, and of the core nation of
the former Yugoslavia, i.e., Serbia.
For instance, wars have been fought along the
belt between Russia and its surroundings, including
the Baltic states, which suffered from war prior to
the breakup of the USSR, the Trans-Caucassus suf-
fered wars before and after the breakup of the USSR,
Moldavia, Tajikistan and Chechnya and so on. The
same is true of Serbia. The Kosovo crisis is the most
recent case in point. Areas irrelevant to the adjust-
ment of the political configuration are immune to
war, such as the US and Western Europe. This is
true even of areas relevant but not controversial to
the adjustment of the political configuration, such
as the most interior parts of Eastern Europe and Rus-
sia per se. Of course, the wars of the post-Cold War
strategic adjustment are by no means larger than those
of the two world wars, for the reason that the the
adjustment needs of the former are much smaller than
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those of the latter. Furthermore, since the power of
the US, the preponderant power of the world before
and after the end of Cold War, has not declined but
rather risen, post-World War II international institu-
tions are still intact and relevant in the post-Cold
War era. Therefore, it is justified to say that the cur-
rent change of the world configuration is in fact an
alteration of it. In this sense, the old configuration
resulting from World War II has not fundamentally
changed in the post-Cold War era.
3. Adjustment of World
Configuration, US Global
Strategy, and Western Europe
as the Potential Challenger
to US Global Status
The US global strategy is the major weight in
the adjustment of the world configuration. The US
is the only power that has the capacity to act glo-
bally. The early 1990s are symbolic years, testifying
that the distribution of power among the world's
major nations has changed greatly in favour of the
US leadership. The Soviet Union, one of the two
superpowers, expired and left the scene as a much
weaker Russian state. The US economy boomed and
showed more dynamic than Japan and Western Eu-
rope with its "new economy". China, with its GDP
quadrupled, rose most remarkably in its international
status, in contrast to others, by the end of the Cold
War. All in all, by the end of the Cold War, the four
major power centres, Western Europe, Russia, China
and Japan are more equalized in their strength and
the US takes the indisputable lead, which is most
significant to the new configuration of world poli-
tics.
Now we have a clearer picture of where the
US can apply its global strategy. There are four ma-
jor strategic areas in the world in the eyes of US
strategists, namely, America, Europe, East Asia and
the Indian Ocean. In America, the US, being a dis-
proportionately bigger power, pays little attention to
the region. In the Indian Ocean and the Middle East,
sub-centres of power are in a real multi-polar struc-
ture, which weakens its challenge to the US leader-
ship in the region. There are three strategic centres
in Europe, which are NATO, Russia and Yugosla-
via. There are also three strategic centres in East Asia,
which are the US-Japan Security Treaty and ASEAN,
China and Russia. No power of the above has direct
ambition towards US territory, though some have
strategic ambitions and capacity regarding their own
regions, that is why Europe and East Asia are the
two areas in which the US must become directly in-
volved. The US of course has its strategic influence,
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strategic presence and strategic interest in all four
areas.
Western Europe is the only one among the four
centres that has the potentiality, or at least one of
closest to have the potentiality, to challenge the US
global status. East Asia is no match for Western Eu-
rope in this respect. East Asia shares no world-wide
accepted cultural power and does not even have a
regional institution like EU, which is the most pow-
erful regional integrating structure in the world. The
sub-regional structures in Asia are either modest in
economic and political strength or in membershiped
with US itself. Western Europe is disadvantaged in
challenging US global status. Firstly, Western Eu-
rope is geographically contiguous to a much larger
area of poorly developed countries than the US.
Secondly, the world economy is more glo-
balized and has a more vertical pattern oflabour dis-
tribution where the US economy is on the top of this
vertical structure, which is itself an asset to economic
competitiveness.
More specifically, to be on the top is to have
more value-added products in the global economy.
The only way for Western Europe is to quicken the
pace of European economic and political and mili-
tary integration so as to get rid of this structural con-
straint In order to maintain its position, the US must
take advantage of its predominant status to contain
this European integration within an acceptable con-
fine.
The US is actually taking intensive steps (the
Kosovo crisis is a case in point) to check this ten-
dency, since Western Europe is very close to the criti-
cal point in the process of its economic integration,
political integration and military integration. West-
ern Europe and the US are entering into an inevita-
ble and tacit zero-sum game.
There are more reasons why Western Europe
is the global and regional centre of gravity to the US
global strategy. In the wake of the Cold War, the three
centres of East Asia are more balanced in their re-
spective comprehensive national power than those
in Europe. Though China is growing fast economi-
cally, it is far behind Japan in economic power. Ja-
pan is far ahead of China and Russia in economic
terms, but weaker in security terms. By contrast, the
balance of power in Europe is in favour of Western
Europe. Furthermore, all powers put together in Eu-
rope are larger than those in Asia. Therefore, US glo-
bal strategic centres of gravity in the world at large
and in the region are both in Europe and not in Asia
in the post-Cold War era. By contrast, in the Cold
War era, the aggregate power in Europe was also
stronger than that in Asia, and thus military confron-
tation was more intensive than that in Asia, but the
strength between Western Europe and the Eastearn
bloc was more balanced than in Asia, where the
Marxist countries were much stronger than Japan and
other quasi-capitalist Asian countries. So, in the Cold
War era, the US global strategy was focused in Eu-
rope while its regional strategy was, on the other
hand, in Asia. In the Cold War era, the US had
launched two protracted regional wars in Asia, and
none in Europe, so as to strike Asian strategic bal-
ance. While in the post-Cold War era, the US
launched no direct regional wars in East Asia but
intervened many times in Europe, and for the same
reason: to strike a strategic balance in Europe, since
Western Europe is now more powerful than the other
two centres of power, Russia and Yugoslavia. The
US military intervention in the Kosovo crisis has
been the largest of the kind world-wide since the end
of the Cold War. In addition, despite the fact that the
two military organisations, NATO and the US-Japan
Security Treaty, both pursue an expansionist strat-
egy, the US, in Europe, intervenes in the European
affairs directly, by such methods as incorporating the
three Visegrad countries in NATO first but not in the
EU, if at all: also the US took the lead in NATO's
attack on Yugoslavia, while in Asia it lets Japan play
a relatively larger role than the US in Japan's expan-
sion of its defensive sphere, and invites Japan and
Taiwan to participate in the US sponsored "TMD"
plan (Theatre Missile Defence Plan). In other words,
relatively speaking, through the expansion of the
Atlantic security alliance, the US expands its own
military strength, while the expansion of the Far East
security alliance serves to strengthen US allies.
US global strategy is to maintain the one-su-
perpower-plus-major-powers configuration. Any
merger of two major powers would outstrip US
power. By the same token, any decline of one major
power would induce this power to look for conven-
ient a marriage with, orland protection of, any other
major power. The strength resulting from this mar-
riage would very likely outstrip US strength or at
least make trouble for the US leadership. This mar-
riage cannot be between anyone major power and
the US, for there is no major power geographically
adjacent to US. Neither would it be between any US
ally and the US, as they are already married couples.
It must then be between Russia or China and any
other major power, or between Russia and China.
Russia would look for marriage with Western Eu-
rope or China. China would look for Japan or Rus-
sia. Any of the above scenarios would be a night-
mare to the US. In sum, the maintenance of the sta-
tus quo in the world configuration, i.e., the one-su-
perpower-plus-major-powers configuration, is in the
best interest of the US, and is therefore its highest
global strategic objective. The US strategy is to pre-
vent submergence of any major power. Regional wars
are only to serve this purpose.
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4. Adjustment of European
Configuration and Kosovo Crisis
In the Cold War era, there were three independ-
ent strategic centres in Europe: NATO, WTO(Warsaw
Treaty Organisation) and Yugoslavia. Other European
countries were neutral plus the so-called fourth stra-
tegic centre of Albania. The strategies of the three
centres were logically interwoven. To illustrate the
ATO strategy, let us cite Josef Joffe: "Structurally-
ATO's functions have always followed the immor-
tal words of Lord Ismay, its first secretary-general:
'To keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the
Germans down. "'2 The Soviet strategy can be logi-
cally illustrated by reversing NATO strategy, i.e.,
Americans out of Eastern Europe, Germany divided
and Russians in Eastern Europe.
Yugoslavia's strategy in the Cold War was
rather particular. During the World War II, Yugosla-
via's strategic role was not important. The most im-
portant waning states, the Soviet Union, Germany,
the US and Britain, did not projeet too much mili-
tary force into Yugoslavia. In the later stage of the
World War II, when the US, Britain and the Soviet
Union were carving up Europe into post-war spheres
of influence, Stalin's interest in Poland was much
larger than in Yugoslavia. Ironically, the Soviet Un-
ion supported the old regime of Yugoslavia while
Britain supported Communist resistance forces.
This means that no one, West and East alike,
coveted Yugoslavia. They saw it as a liability more
than an asset. That is why Yugoslavia was the only
country in the region that was "liberated" mostly by
itself. Shortly after World War II, Yugoslavia's stay-
ing in the Eastern bloc proved to be no longer cost-
effective in security terms and thus dispensed by the
Soviet Union. The US lost no time in recognising
Yugoslavia as independent and with quite a consid-
erable amount of economic aid in return. But the
Soviet Union would not have stayed idle ifYugosla-
via had lost its independence to the West. Hence
Yugoslavia's independence was no choice.
While in the post-Cold War era, NATO's strat-
egy can still be illustrated by quoting Josef Joffe,
"Strangely enough, these may be precisely the rea-
sons that-suitably refurbished-still provide the
triple raison d' etrc of the Atlantic All iance ... Russia
is simply too 'big' for Europe ...Germany is too big
to be left alone, and not big enough to go it
alone ... Europe has flourished because the United
States has essentially become a European power-
and Europe did not flourish, as in the first half of
thi century, when American power was not part of
the balance.'? In addition, NATO feared Russia's size
in the Cold War because of its strength, while in the
post-Cold War NATO fears Russia's size because of
its weakness or caprice. It is also the very reason of
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Russia's independent strategic position and inde-
pendent strategy in the European trategic arena in
the post-Cold War era. Otherwise, ATO's strategic
completeness is doubtful. As a Singaporean senior
commentator put it coneisely, "The US needs at
present to strengthen NATO indeed, but with differ-
ent purpose. Kosovo crisis led to the toughness of
Russia. This is just what the US cherished."
ow, as arrayed above, two of the three old
strategic centres have survived the end of the Cold
War. Let us now look at Yugoslavia, the third centre,
to see if it can also survive. And we want also to
examine how the vacuum left over by Russia and
Yugoslavia respectively will be filled. In the Cold
War, they did not take for granted that Yugoslavia
was within the US strategic sphere, but it was defi-
nitely not in Germany. It was Germany, however,
following the end of Cold War and German unifica-
tion, that first recognised, if not provided help, the
independence of Croatia and Slovenia. "The US rec-
ognised their independence under the German pres-
sure. "4 The US would not forget this. The US would
not give up its influence over Yugoslavia.
Neither would Russia. In Russias' view, Yu-
goslavia was independent in the Cold War, so should
it be in the post-Cold War. Russians insist that Rus-
sia must be consulted if any change is going to be
made in the European configuration, especially if
Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia are to be involved.
The Russians are well aware that the West is not sin-
cere in its sugge tions to incorporate Russia in the
Western system, and therefore the West should give
Russia its eorresponding status in Europe.
In addition, had Yugoslavia lost its independ-
ence to the West, the West would have moved its stra-
tegic frontline forward to Russia's. Would Russia al-
low this? Is the West prepared for this, or is this in the
real interest of the West? To common reason, it is not
cost-effective to incorporate Yugoslavia in the West-
em system, in the Cold War and the post-Cold War
alike. In the Cold War, it was the pay-off that the US
made for Yugoslavia's "independence". ow, in the
post-Cold War era, who wants to pay for its "depend-
ence"? This does not mean that the West wants to see
a big Yugoslavia. A big Yugoslavia is no doubt a threat
to the West. The US wants to see a divided Yugosla-
via between a small Yugoslavia and a group of se-
ceded Yugoslavian republics. "The US wants to leave
some kindling in order to contain Europe'"
Yugoslavia is also very clear about its status
in the post-Cold War Europe. Yugoslavia knows that
it benefited from the Cold War and thus the benefits
ended with the end of Cold War. Yugoslavia is not
like Russia, which is independent and prestigious,
nor is it like some East European nations, which are
useful, though somewhat dependent. Yugoslavia is
independent but not prestigious and useful.
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Yugoslavia disintegrated in the wake of the Cold
War. The process of its disintegration was wrought
with military conflicts. The six former federal repub-
lics are complicated and differentiated in terms of
ethnics, culture and territorial claims. In the Cold War,
the Serbia Republic and the Serbs were the major state
and ethnic entity of Yugoslavia and thus actually domi-
nated the national defence institutions and defence
resources of Yugoslavia. The "international commu-
nity" had no objection to this, so long as it was help-
ful to the European balance of power. But since the
end of the Cold War, the West stopped recognising
Serbia's dominant position in Yugoslavia, for a big
Yugoslavia was no longer an element of the balance
of power against the Soviet Union. Not only Serbia
but also Yugoslavia as a whole, lost support from the
West that used to be the last factor that held the other-
wise quite impossible ethnic groups together. Those
ethnic groups except the Serbs, demanded more au-
tonomy or even independence. Independence is easy
but territorial demands and agreements are not. The
major salient territorial disputes were and are between
Serbia and other republics. The same is true of mili-
tary conflicts.
The West supports national self-determination
whenever the issue of national or ethnic disputes
emerges. Self-determination is popular not only with
the West in modem times. During the long history
of mankind, it has always been true that unity is good
for my family and self-determination for my neigh-
bours. Since Serbia is the main party that objects to
self-determination, it is therefore the main object of
the West's isolation policy. Why not evolution policy
or westward-enlargement policy, which have been
applied to most other post-communist countries? The
answer is: strategic interest and not ideological in-
terest is the crucial criterion in applying different
policies to different nations.
The term West is in Europe, semantically, dif-
ferent from the term West applied to the world at
large. The former denotes US leadership, while the
latter denotes US-European cooperation. The strate-
gic discrepancy between the two is apparent in the
European arena. The EU wants a war, if at all, that
ends all wars. But the US thinks differently as is ar-
gued earlier with the "kindling theory". The EU may
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or may not agree with US strategy over the former
Yugoslavia. The EU supports US strategy if it is in
agreement with it. But the EU has to go with the US
even ifEU does not agree with US strategy. The EU
is an economic organisation. The EU is mostly not
an organisation to discuss political issues and secu-
rity issues. Political integration and security integra-
tion is the future, if not distant future, on EU agen-
das. How can an international organisation like this
collectively and successfully resist US strategy even
if it happens to have the intention? In summary,
NATO's military action against Yugoslavia followed
US strategy, which includes preventing the EU from
being out of US control. Thus, NATO's strategy is
in fact the US strategy. One of the NATO strategies
that "keeps Germany down" survived the end of the
Cold War, but with only an insignificant refurbish-
ment, i.e., replacing Germany with ED. "NATO is
the most ideal instrument that the US can playoff
Europe with'"
The adjustment of the European configuration
mainly involves the area between Western Europe
and Russia, which this article refers to as post-com-
munist Europe, or PCE. As far as the prospect of the
adjustment is concerned, five scenarios can be ex-
cluded: l. PCE unity and independence, for it will
be opposed by the East and the West alike. 2. the
PCE as wholely dependent on Russia, for it will be
opposed by the West. 3. the PCE a wholely depend-
ent on the West; for it will be opposed by Russia and
West. To Russia, it is a threat, and to the West, it is a
burden. 4. The PCE as an anarchic or strategic
vacuum, for it will be opposed by the West as it will
be a larger threat than anything to the West. 5. Part
of the PCE comes into the sphere of German influ-
ence, for it will be opposed by the US as it will be an
expansion of German power to a critical point.
Actually, whatsoever the scenario, the PCE has
broken down into four parts: 1. Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary have already joined NATO,
and a limited number of other PCEs will follow.' 2.
All PCE nations will not completely extricate them-
selves from Russia's influence." 3. Serbia will main-
tain some sort of independence, not necessarily glo-
riously though. 4. The rest of PCE nations will ei-
ther be in confrontation with Serbia or with Russia .
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